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THE LONE WOLF TERRORIST: MECHANISMS AND TRIGGERS
OF A PROCESS-DRIVEN RADICALIZATION 
Cody Pajunen 
Introduction 
In early 2015, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) launched a social 
media campaign calling for the enlistment of “lone wolf ” terrorists to carry 
out attacks throughout Great Britain.1 Providing an assortment of attack rec­
ommendations and suggestions online, ISIL sought to galvanize individuals 
to carry out devastating violence on its behalf. The ISIL “call to duty” is not 
directed at specific individuals, yet British anti-radicalization expert Haras
Rafiq claims these virtual threats must “be taken with the utmost seriousness.”2 
Rafiq’s instruction should not be overlooked. Lone wolves represent a small, yet 
potent threat to national and international security. Although normally carried 
out by single individuals, the amount of lone wolf terrorist attacks between the 
1970s to the present have increased by forty-five percent in the U.S. and by 
1 E x p r e s s M a g a z i n e , “ I S C a l l s f o r ‘ L o n e Wo l f ’ Te r r o r A t t a c k s i n 




               
           
              
            
              
          
        
           
           
           
          
            
  
           
  






four-hundred and twelve percent throughout Europe.3 Lone wolves represent 
a threat to security because of their unpredictability. They attack in sporadic 
intervals for a variety of causes and come from a diverse array of backgrounds. 
No single profile of a lone wolf can be constructed and, as a result, they are 
extremely difficult to detect and neutralize before they violently act out. Because 
one common profile of lone wolves can be difficult to construct, it may seem as 
though they will be impossible to identify. However, a commonality between 
all lone wolves exists: radicalization. According to the UK government, radi­
calization is “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and 
forms of extremism leading to terrorism.”4 If this process can be identified by 
authorities, lone wolves and their impending attacks could be undermined in 
the future. This begs the question: how does an individual become radicalized 
to the point of carrying out a terrorist attack as a lone wolf? 
To answer this question, what a lone wolf terrorist is must first be established. 
For starters, lone wolves are terrorists. According to the Central Intelligence 
Agency, a terrorist is an individual who executes premeditated violence against 
noncombatant targets for political purposes.5 Terrorist actions are subsequently 
carried out to redistribute political resources in a society.6 Lone wolves are 
individuals who execute violent actions for political purposes, however, they 
represent a distinct variation of terrorism. Lone wolf expert, Dr. Ramon Spaaij, 
differentiates lone wolf terrorists from other types of terrorists by looking at 
three key factors: operating individually, not belonging to a formal terrorist 
group or organization, and having a modus operandi that is not subject to 
3 Sarah Teich, “Trends and Developments in Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western World: An 
Analysis of Terrorist Attacks and Attempted Attacks by Islamic Extremists,” International Institute 
for Counter-Terrorism (2013): 4, http://i-hls.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Lone-Wolf-Sarah­
Teich-2013.pdf. 
4 Ines Von Behr, Charlie Edwards, Luke Gribbon, and Anais Reding, “Radicalisation in the 
Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism,” RAND Corporation 
(2013): 2, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_ 
RR453.pdf. 
5 “Terrorism FAQs,” Central Intelligence Agency. Last Modified April 19, 2013, https://www. 
cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/terrorism-faqs.html. 
6 Scott Atran and Marc Sageman, “Theoretical Frame on Pathways to Violent Radicalization: 
Understanding the Ideas and Behaviors, How They Interact and How They Describe Pathways to 
Violence in Marginalized Diaspora,” Artis Research (August 2009): 15. 
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external influence.7 This does not mean lone wolf terrorists (LWTs) are not 
under the ideological influence of a specific movement or organization but 
rather that their actions are self-initiated, self-directed, and self-sustaining. 
However, what specifically drives an individual to autonomously carry out an 
act of terror has remained elusive even to experts. In an attempt to highlight 
the transition from civilian to lone wolf terrorist, forensic psychology experts 
J. Reid Meloy and Jessica Yakeley believe it necessary to look at one issue in 
particular: how the lone wolf terrorist morally sanctions his or her actions.8 
This process of an individual morally sanctioning terrorist actions is known as 
radicalization. Radicalization is a dynamic, fluid path that prompts individuals 
to commit violence on behalf of a certain political goal. Political forces should 
subsequently be the focus of radicalization. A comprehensive blueprint of the 
radicalization process lone wolf terrorists undergo from a political perspective 
has yet to be established. This research seeks to illuminate the radicalization that 
lone wolf terrorists undergo occurs in a step-wise process. This process starts 
with the isolation experienced by lone wolves. Identification with a certain 
cause or social movement by the lone wolf is subsequently covered. Finally, the 
way in which lone wolf terrorist attacks are physically externalized is addressed. 
Isolation 
Mechanisms 
Political forces are the most substantial drivers of lone wolf radicalization. 
However, it should be noted that psychological mechanisms have set the stage 
in aiding an individual autonomously sanctioning politically motivated violence. 
Many lone wolves, although not all, have suffered from the limited development 
of the prefrontal cortex region of the brain. As a result, they may display traits of 
impulsivity, grandiosity, and vulnerability that are all indicative of psychological 
immaturity.9 The combination of these factors relating to an underdeveloped 
prefrontal cortex in an individual forges isolated tendencies. Psychological im­
maturity and vulnerability makes the threat of social rejection unbearable. As a 
7 Ramon Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 33 (2010): 856. 
8 Reid J. Meloy and Jessica Yakeley, “The Violent True Believer as a “Lone Wolf”- Psychoanalytic 
Perspectives on Terrorism,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 32 (2014): 358. 
9 Reid J. Meloy and Jessica Yakeley, “The Violent True Believer as a “Lone Wolf”- Psychoanalytic 
Perspectives on Terrorism,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 32 (2014): 351. 
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result, physical isolation can be partially derived from pre-existing psychological
forces. However, these psychological forces are not a sufficient means of ex­
plaining the isolation of lone wolf radicalization. According to a United States 
Naval Postgraduate statistical analysis of fifty-three American LWTs, there is 
no significant correlation between psychological disorders and the formation 
of a LWT.10 Lone wolves are supposedly autonomous actors, but how can 
this be if other factors aside from their own psyches are necessary in catalyzing 
their violent actions? The answer lies in the fact that acting autonomously is 
not necessarily the same as thinking autonomously. 
Triggers 
LWTs are differentiated from their organization-Affiliated terrorist counterparts 
because they act autonomously. Terrorists obtain the label “lone wolf” based 
off their actions, not their beliefs. Lone wolves acquire their label by acting 
autonomously not necessarily by thinking autonomously. Coming under the 
ideological influence of a terrorist organization does not necessarily nullify the 
LWT label because beliefs can be separated from actions. Radical influences 
such as terrorist dogma can prove extremely influential among isolated indi­
viduals. For example, United States Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan believed 
that Muslims were being exploited as a result of the US’s wars in the Middle 
East—a belief held by many radical jihadi groups to which Hasan was exposed. 
His perspectives on Islam and the plight of modern Muslims were formed in 
isolation via external jihadi influence. However, he independently executed 
the Fort Hood massacre from resource and tactical standpoints. By acting in 
an autonomous manner, Hasan fills all the criteria of a LWT even though his 
beliefs were influenced by a broader social movement. Hasan’s isolation al­
lowed his belief system to be heavily swayed by external tides of jihadi beliefs. 
It was these beliefs, constructed in isolation that prompted Hasan to execute 
the massacre at Fort Hood. Therefore, the effect of beliefs in isolation can be 
seen as a crucial precursor to action. 
External radicalizing agents, such as beliefs, solidify physical and spiritual 
isolation within lone wolves. Preexisting psychological tendencies have set 
up isolationist tendencies within vulnerable individuals; however, it is the 
Charles A. Eby, “The Nation that Cried Lone Wolf: A Data-Driven Analysis of 
Individual Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11,” Naval Postgraduate School, March 2012, 
p. 61, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/6789/12Mar_Eby.pdf?sequence=1. 
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influences that stress politicized beliefs that trigger sustained isolation. These 
politicized beliefs can take many forms but nonetheless stress the necessity of 
a redistribution of power throughout the world. General Hasan fell prey to the
belief system of jihadi ‘crusaders’ who stress the plight of Muslims throughout 
the world. He withdrew himself to such an extent that the Fort Hood mas­
sacre came as a complete shock to all affected. The overarching political forces 
of existing jihadi dogma surrounding Hasan triggered genuine isolation that 
helped drive his eventual attack. Isolation, however, is only a stepping-stone on 
the path of radicalization on which lone wolves embark. External politicizing 
agents help trigger sustained isolation within lone wolves and continue to drive 
radicalization. The accumulation of external radicalizing agents aligns potential 
lone wolves with a certain identity—an identity that forms another necessary 
facet of the radicalization process. 
Identification 
Identification Mechanisms 
Two mechanisms act as structural elements that set the stage for potential 
LWTs to embark on the process of identification. The first mechanism is that 
of the social movement. Social Movement Theory describes the effects of social 
movements and gives great insight into the diffusion of external influences
that play a part in shaping and projecting individuals’ ideas. It asserts that 
social movements consist of a “set of opinions and beliefs in a population 
which represents preferences for changing the social structure and/or reward 
distribution of a society.”11 The primary goal of a social movement is to garner 
the sympathy of a population so that the movement’s cause can gain societal 
traction. To acquire this sympathy, a social movement may have a relatively
broad platform of beliefs so that it may appeal to a wide range of individuals.
Organizations direct operations amongst a population to diffuse the idea that 
social movements provide. These are known as social movement organizations 
(SMOs). Al-Qaeda is an example of an organization advancing the spread of 
the broader jihadist social movement. 
Social movements produce belief systems attractive to those looking to 
manifest intrinsic political frustrations. Lone wolves latch on to these diffused 
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zaid, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: 
A Partial Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1217-1218. 
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belief systems. Being isolated, lone wolves often fuse these external belief systems 
with their own. These belief systems are violent in nature. Al-Qaeda’s adherence 
to its interpretation of jihadism, for example, blends individual beliefs with 
militant and homicidal undertones. The belief systems of lone wolves adhering 
to Al-Qaeda-inspired dogma are infiltrated and manipulated by violent beliefs 
and values. Social movements thus serve as mechanisms that help structure the 
identity of lone wolves. Lone wolves take up a cause that a social movement 
advocates for, come under the influence of the movement’s belief system, and 
subsequently identify with its goals and vision. 
SMO operations revolve around maintaining group survival and ensuring 
a favorable cost/reward relationship for individuals that participate in their 
activities.12 In short, organizations need dedicated followers to advance their 
goals. To acquire followers, organizations need to deploy resources in order to 
make their cause attractive. Resources represent the second identification mecha­
nism. Moral, cultural, human, material, and socio-organizational resources all 
aid in advancing the efforts of an SMO.13 Moral resources appeal to value 
systems of populations. Cultural resources provide organizations with “strate­
gic know-how” that enables efforts to sustain recruitment amongst a specific 
population.14 Human resources solidify an organization’s expertise, labor size, 
and leadership to give it credibility in numbers, charisma, and work capacity. 
Material resources include tangible assets such as monetary funds, property, and 
supplies that an organization has at its disposal. Socio-organizational assets 
constitute an organization’s infrastructure, social network, and organizational 
capacities. These different types of resources function as a mechanism of the 
identification process of LWT radicalization by structuring the societal image 
of social movements and organizations. They ultimately lay the foundation for 
the diffusion of an SM’s or SMO’s goals. Such diffusion creates the appeal of 
movements and organizations to make its message more conducive to attract­
ing potential LWTs. 
The extent to which these resources can be acquired and deployed thus 
12 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zaid, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: 
A Partial Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977):1226. 
13  Bob Edwards and Patrick F. Gillham, “Resource Mobilization Theory,” The Wiley-
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dictates the success of an SMO. Al-Qaeda is an organization emblematic of 
effectively distributed resources. It has been supported by international “celebri­
ties” such as Osama bin Laden and enjoys sympathy from national governments 
such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, giving it ample moral resources. Culturally, 
Al-Qaeda targets potential LWTs by using social media to facilitate the inter­
national popularity of its Inspire Magazine, which diffuses its message and
ideology across the globe. Al-Qaeda’s human assets include experts trained in 
the art of terror tactics, the maintenance of terror financing networks, and war­
fare. Al-Qaeda’s material resources entail the acquisition of safe-haven property 
and transnational funding. From a socio-organizational resource standpoint, 
Al-Qaeda offers potential recruits access to digital support networks so that 
physical contact doesn’t have to ever be made for belief alignment to be diffused. 
By combining all these variations of resources, Al-Qaeda has had the op­
portunity to diffuse its ideological base to lone wolves. The organization projects 
its message as a product made available for potential consumers and potential 
lone wolves to access. The act of employing multiple resources simultaneously 
to make a certain message or product appealing to isolated individuals is known 
as “slick packaging” in Social Movement Theory. Slick packaging is deployed 
to increase the overall appeal of a certain social movement product. The more 
appealing the message, the more likely an isolated individual will enter the 
process of lone wolf radicalization.15 The resources deployed by social move­
ment organizations thus operate as a mechanism for lone wolf identification 
by providing an appealing message with which to align. 
Identification Triggers 
The mechanisms that may lead isolated individuals down the path of radical­
ization do not themselves forge a lone wolf to identify with a greater cause. 
Millions of individuals worldwide are exposed to radical movements daily, yet 
a seemingly negligible percentage of this vast population turn out to become 
lone wolves. This is because only an intrinsic trigger can forge a lone wolf. This 
trigger comes in the form of a personal grievance. Most of society becomes 
exposed to social movement ideologies yet few harbor a grievance that produces 
the propensity for violent action. In the case of lone wolves, a grievance consists 
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zaid, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: 
A Partial Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1231. 
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of an inner animosity aimed at an external source. 
The fact that lone wolves exhibit grievances is not surprising given their 
tendencies to be narcissistic and isolated. Being narcissistic, lone wolves often 
times perceive events only in the context of how they are affected and blame 
external sources for misfortune that has befallen them. This grievance can be 
derived from a variety of sources but nonetheless is individually constructed. 
Social movement entities, such as Al-Qaeda, prey on existing grievances that 
many have such as the disenfranchisement of Muslims in poor European com­
munities. The message Al-Qaeda sends of justice via violence becomes appealing
to many who inhabit grievances regarding the plight of Muslims in these
areas. Once external messages meet internal animosities, the process of lone 
wolf identification culminates. Lone wolf grievances find seemingly credible 
outlets such as social movement organizations to manifest their frustrations 
and remain loyal to them as result. 
Grievances, although necessary, are not a sufficient trigger to solidifying 
lone wolf identification. Grievances help lone wolves align their inner beliefs 
with external sources. They run individual beliefs parallel to that of a certain 
movement or group but have not been able to completely converge the two 
belief systems. In order for a potential lone wolf to completely identify with 
a specific movement or group, an individual must undergo vicarious cogni­
tive dissonance. Vicarious cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual’s 
belief system is altered after a person of an in-group is observed committing a 
hypocritical act.16 This hypocritical act creates dissonance in the observer. The 
observer wants to fully identify with a group or individual but has a difficult 
time in doing so as a result of the hypocritical act that was witnessed, creating 
dissonance between the observer’s preexisting morals and the urge to identify 
with an external source. To quell this dissonance, the attitudes towards the 
hypocritical act are altered to support it. 
By morally sanctioning the wrongful act of an outside source, attitude 
changes become solidified as both belief systems converge. In this case, the 
structured message of an external force solidifies identification by providing a 
product with such high appeal that individual, internal psychological impulses 
Scott Atran and Marc Sageman, “Theoretical Frame on Pathways to Violent 
Radicalization: Understanding the Ideas and Behaviors, How They Interact and How They Describe 
Pathways to Violence in Marginalized Diaspora,” Artis Research (August 2009): 81. 
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force the convergence of belief systems between the mechanism and individual. 
This convergence is catalyzed by the trigger of psychologically vulnerable indi­
viduals to dedicate themselves to an entity bigger than themselves at the cost 
of their natural moral compass. Identification is completed when this forced 
convergence in belief systems is solidified. After the completion of identifica­
tion, the final necessary means in the radicalization process of potential LWTs 
is initiated: externalization. 
Externalization 
At this point in the radicalization process, potential LWTs are isolated and
have subsequently identified with an overarching movement. As complex as 
these first two steps may be, a lone wolf terrorist has not yet been formed. 
Rather, a socially marginalized “ideologue” has been produced. In order to be 
considered a terrorist, one must perform a terrorist act. To be considered an 
act, a potential LWT must physically externalize his or her inner frustration.
A new combination of mechanisms must come into contact with a different 
set of triggers in order for externalization to occur. 
Mechanisms of Externalization 
Similarly to isolation and identification, externalization manifests via structural 
elements. These three elements include the formation of a perceived injustice, 
development of a negative identification, and a lack of legitimate political outlets
available to externalize frustrations. These mechanisms interact with one another 
to direct a potential LWT’s inner animosity outward. Once in place, these ele­
ments lay fertile ground for certain triggers that ultimately result in a terrorist 
act. The three mechanisms of lone wolf externalization follow a pattern. First, 
the root of a certain problem is identified by the lone wolf. Next, the perceived 
reason as to why a problem needs to be addressed is solidified. Finally, the lone 
wolf creates a blueprint as to exactly how a problem is going to be addressed. 
During the identification process, lone wolves form a favorable opinion of a 
certain movement’s values, beliefs, and actions. These favorable opinions form 
what is known as positive identification. This positive identification, depend­
ing on the movement with which the potential LWT is identifying, can have 
negative effects. Identifying with a certain movement or group means that those 
opposed to it may be viewed in a negative light. Since social movements are 
formed in order to change the status quo of a certain issue, antagonistic forces, 
such as those trying to maintain the status quo or change it, may be seen as 
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the enemy. Usually, this is not an issue because social movements and their 
entailing organizations are not militant toward one another. In the context of 
transnational terrorist or criminal entities, however, militancy is the lingua franca. 
Groups or individuals impeding the progress of a certain militant movement 
are seen as enemy forces that need to be completely undermined or destroyed. 
In the case of lone wolves, the process of vilifying an asserted antagonistic entity 
results in negative identification towards those opposed to the interest of the 
lone wolf ’s Affiliations. 
Negative identification has grave consequences when contextualized in lone
wolves. If an influential social movement or organization designates a group 
as its enemy, members become fixated on destroying it. Isolation has strong 
additive effects on a lone wolf ’s dedication to acting on negative identifica­
tion. The extent to which a problem is occurring in society can be drastically 
miscalculated among isolated actors, especially when psychologically vulnerable 
to narrow-minded assertions and the appeal of grandiose actions. This fixation 
ultimately turns a certain entity, whether it is a person, group, government, or 
label, into an enemy. Since both parties are opposed to one another in terms 
of competing for similar resources of a shared issue, the enemy’s gain is seen as 
the potential LWT’s loss. Thus, the enemy becomes a target so that it cannot 
decrease the LWT’s operations. This targeting acts as a structure for externaliza­
tion because it provides the potential LWT with a direction in which actions 
can be aimed if need be. 
Negative identification provides the “what” of externalization. At this point 
a potential LWT may have a good idea as to “what” should be targeted if neces­
sary. The second externalization mechanism, a perceived injustice, provides the 
potential LWT with the “why”. A perceived injustice is exactly as it seems: an 
action by another, seemingly adversarial, entity that is seen as a direct attack 
on the potential LWT and his or her associated group or goal. This injustice is 
“perceived” because it may or may not have been a direct attack on the LWT. 
The action was construed by either the potential LWT or his or her identified 
group as an attack. Such an “attack” justifies the reasons for hating a certain 
enemy in the first place. The perceived injustice thus structures the potential 
LWT’s opinions by making them believe something must be done to counter 
it so that similar actions do not reoccur. 
A third structural mechanism for externalization is the lack of legitimate 
political outlets through which frustrations can be expressed. If a potential 
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LWT is exhibiting frustrations but is willing to use a legitimate outlet to induce 
change, the externalization of a terrorist act could be nullified. However, the 
positive use of political processes do not always pan out. Even if legitimate 
political outlets do exist, isolated individuals may be so delusional about a
certain problem that they deem any form of accepted political activism as 
inherently corrupt and unable to yield preferred results. Whatever the cause, a 
lack of actual or perceived political outlets give the potential LWT the “how” 
to externalize his or her action. If legal means of externalizing a frustration 
are not available, a different route must be chosen. A lack of effective political 
mechanisms thus structures the externalization of a potential LWT action by 
convincing the individual that the way in which frustrations can be vented must 
include something outside the parameters of legality. In the case of militant 
movements, violence is usually considered a more than viable action. The “what,” 
“why,” and “how” of externalization integrate at this point and cumulatively 
provide the basis for lone wolf terrorist action to be physically manifested. 
Triggers of Externalization 
Three triggers accompany each of the aforementioned structural mechanisms 
of externalization. These triggers are a development of strong reciprocity, moral
obligation, and the formulation of alternative strategies to vent frustrations. 
An important point to note is that these triggers are largely derivatives of an 
individual’s psyche. Only the lone wolf can decide to act on the structural 
mechanisms. This point illustrates the very nature of LWTs and their ulti­
mate autonomy in formulating decisions. These triggers, like their respective 
mechanistic counterparts, follow a process that results in lone wolf terrorism. 
The first trigger in this process is strong reciprocity. Strong reciprocity 
occurs when an individual is willing to make a sacrifice for a thing or idea by 
which he or she is not directly affected.17 The development of this psycho­
logical inclination is actually derived from altruism. Individuals who exhibit 
strong reciprocity want to put forth their resources to sustain an overall cause 
or idea they deem worthy. However, in any social environment, there will 
always be those who free-ride off of altruistic behavior (defectors). Those who 
defect from cooperating with a cause or movement are considered an enemy 
Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “The Psychology on Lone-Wolf Terrorism,” 
Counseling Psychology Quarterly 24 no.2 (2011): 121. 
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by individuals who behave altruistically because they (the defectors) impede 
upon the advancement of a certain movement, idea, or goal for which others are 
working toward. Strong reciprocity induces individuals to remedy the problem
of defectors by either coercing them into cooperation or exterminating them. 
The defectors represent the entity which the lone wolf negatively identifies with 
and subsequently plan to attack. Strong reciprocity thus triggers lone wolf at­
tacks by providing justification for attacking a specific target. 
A second externalization trigger presents itself in the form of moral ob­
ligation. A moral obligation produces the trigger as to why a lone wolf must 
externalize an inner frustration in the form of a terrorist act. At this point, a 
social movement or organization has already provided a message clarifying the 
reasons as to why a certain entity must be perceived as the enemy. Lone wolves 
subsequently develop an intrinsic justification of attacking the target laid out 
by the social movement or organization. Once the moral obligation of a lone 
wolf to carry out an attack on specific target converges with the message of an 
outside radicalizing agent, the externalization process is further solidified. 
The final trigger leading to a lone wolf attack is a plan of execution. Here, 
the lone wolf has solidified his or her moral obligation to exhibiting strong 
reciprocity against a specific target. What has not yet been determined is exactly 
how such a moral obligation will be acted on. In order for the lone wolf to 
carry out his or her perceived moral obligation, a plan outside the legal realms 
of political representation must be devised. Although acting autonomously, it 
is important to remember that lone wolves act under the influence of a certain, 
often violence-prone, group or movement. The alternative strategy a lone wolf 
devises is thus frequently a violent act. This strategy integrates the power of 
the two previously mentioned triggers and guides them to a self-directed plan 
of action. When an alternative, violent outlet to vent a political frustration is 
acted upon, a terrorist act is executed and a lone wolf terrorist is formed. 
Conclusion 
The process of an individual transforming into a lone wolf terrorist contains an 
immeasurable amount of interacting factors. These factors differ from individual 
to individual as psyches and experiences are never the same between any two 
people. However, a commonality among all lone wolves is that each under­
went a process consisting of isolation, identification, and externalization. This 
process, no matter the amount of variables involved, forged an individual that 
112 
            
               
              
         
          
           
Cody Pajunen 
autonomously committed an act of terror. These acts of terror, without a doubt, 
have and will continue to differ according to place, time, extent of destruction, 
and justification. The point of this paper is not to give an exact formula for the 
type of person that will become a lone wolf terrorist but to provide a procedural 
framework in regards to the political forces that interact in the process of lone 
wolf radicalization. The effects of both structural mechanisms and intrinsically 
driven triggers show that more factors than just the individual are at play in 
the formation of lone wolf terrorists. Rather, learned behaviors combine an 
individual’s environment and psychological impulses to produce actions. This 
complex combination forges the radicalization process of the lone wolf terrorist.
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